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Abstract
We conducted a cross-sectional study in 2009 to determine the seroprevalence and risk factors for highly pathogenic
avian influenza A (H5N1) [HPAI H5N1] virus antibodies among poultry workers at farms and live bird markets with
confirmed/suspected poultry outbreaks during 2009 in Bangladesh. We tested sera by microneutralization assay
using A/Bangladesh/207095/2008 (H5N1; clade 2.2.2) virus with confirmation by horse red blood cell
hemagglutination inhibition and H5-specific Western blot assays. We enrolled 212 workers from 87 farms and 210
workers from three live bird markets. One hundred and two farm workers (48%) culled poultry. One hundred and
ninety-three farm workers (91%) and 178 market workers (85%) reported direct contact with poultry that died during a
laboratory confirmed HPAI H5N1 poultry farm outbreak or market poultry die-offs from suspected HPAI H5N1.
Despite exposure to sick poultry, no farm or market poultry workers were seropositive for HPAI H5N1 virus antibodies
(95% confidence interval 0–1%).
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Introduction
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A [HPAI H5N1]
virus (clade 2.2.2) was first identified among poultry in
Bangladesh in March 2007 [1]. As of 29 April 2013, 549
commercial and backyard poultry farms had confirmed HPAI
H5N1 outbreaks across 51 out of 64 districts [2]. The first
human case of HPAI H5N1 virus infection in Bangladesh was
identified in a child during 2008 through routine community
surveillance for influenza in Dhaka. A chicken was purchased
from the local market and slaughtered in the child’s home
before he developed a febrile respiratory illness [3].
Risk factors for avian-to-human transmission of HPAI H5N1
virus include direct or close contact with sick or dead infected
poultry, or visiting a live bird market [4–6]. Approximately five
million people in Bangladesh are employed in large-scale and
small-scale poultry farms [7]. Poultry sellers who handle live
poultry, and slaughter, defeather or eviscerate chickens without
the use of any personal protective equipment may have
occupational exposure to HPAI H5N1 virus.
The frequency or the risk of avian-to-human HPAI H5N1
virus transmission, including risk of clinically mild illness and
asymptomatic infection, among poultry workers in Bangladesh
is unknown. Understanding the risk of avian-to-human HPAI
H5N1 virus transmission from poultry to humans can assist in
planning intervention activities that could prevent human
infection with HPAI H5N1 virus. We conducted a cross-
sectional study during 2009 to determine the seroprevalence of
HPAI H5N1 virus antibody and risk factors for HPAI H5N1 virus
infection among poultry workers in farms with laboratory
confirmed HPAI H5N1 poultry outbreaks or in live bird markets
with poultry die-offs from suspected HPAI H5N1 virus infection.
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Methods
Ethics statement
The study team obtained written informed consent from the
workers before enrollment. The institutional review boards at
icddr,b, IEDCR and CDC reviewed and approved the research
protocol.
Settings
Poultry farms with HPAI H5N1 outbreaks.  We conducted
this study in poultry farms across Bangladesh that reported
HPAI H5N1 outbreaks that were laboratory confirmed by the
Department of Livestock Services (DLS), under the Ministry of
Fisheries and Livestock, Bangladesh. The DLS coordinated
poultry culling in these farms and hired day laborers to help the
farm workers to cull the poultry. The DLS supplied personal
protective equipment (gown, apron, gloves, cap, goggles, N95
mask and shoe covers) to all persons involved in culling. The
Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research
(IEDCR) under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
initiated a two-week follow-up evaluation of poultry workers and
cullers immediately after the culling. During the daily follow-up
IEDCR dispensed post-exposure oseltamivir chemoprophylaxis
(75 mg once daily for 7 days) and observed each person for
clinical signs and symptoms of influenza-like illness [8].
Live bird markets.  There were approximately 127 live bird
markets (wholesale and retail) in Dhaka where live poultry were
sold during 2008–2009 (The Chief Veterinary Officer, DLS,
personal communication). Live birds from all over Bangladesh
were sold in these markets. Live birds sold in the markets
included chickens (layer, broiler and indigenous), ducks,
geese, pigeons and quail. Wholesale markets remained open 7
days a week, 24 hours a day, with workers taking shifts
depending upon the type of work they did. Wholesale markets
had up to a few hundred shops, between one to two thousand
workers, and sold thousands of poultry daily. Some of these
wholesale markets were also retail markets. Retail markets
were open from 6 A.M. to 11 P.M., had approximately 5-100
shops and 15-150 workers, and sold up to a few thousand
poultry daily. Some workers came from outside Dhaka city to
work for a few hours a day or few days a month in these
markets. All shops sold live poultry. Unsold caged poultry
remained in the markets for a few days and were mixed with
birds from newly arrived flocks. The majority of the workers
sold live poultry. Most of these workers also slaughtered,
defeathered and eviscerated birds that were sold in the
markets. Some workers only slaughtered, defeathered and
eviscerated poultry. The DLS initiated surveillance for avian
influenza A viruses among poultry in the live bird markets of
Dhaka, but the results from this surveillance were not available
due to sensitivity of the information.
Selection of poultry farms and live bird markets
We collected a list of farms from the DLS with confirmed
HPAI H5N1 poultry outbreaks that occurred during 29
December 2007 to 22 June 2009. We collected the list of farms
where IEDCR followed poultry workers. We also used the daily
update of poultry outbreaks from the Ministry of Fisheries and
Livestock (http://www.mofl.gov.bd/) and the monthly country
report submitted to the World Organization for Animal Health
by DLS (http://www.oie.int/downld/AVIAN%20INFLUENZA/
A_AI-Asia.htm) to ensure we identified all reported outbreak
farms. In total, we identified 131 farms with confirmed HPAI
H5N1 outbreaks; 99 (75%) farms with outbreaks during 28
December 2007–18 May 2008, 6 (5%) with outbreaks during
July–December 2008 and 26 (20%) with outbreaks during
January–July 2009.
We selected three live bird markets: two of which were the
largest wholesale and retail markets in Dhaka. We assumed
that workers at these markets were more likely to have been
exposed to HPAI H5N1 virus-infected poultry than at smaller
markets because dealers brought the poultry from all over
Bangladesh. We used the presence of ≥5–10% mortality in
caged poultry for two consecutive days as a proxy indicator of
possible HPAI H5N1 virus circulation among these poultry
because we lacked information on laboratory confirmed HPAI
H5N1 virus infection among poultry in these markets. Workers
from all three markets reported that they experienced this level
of poultry mortality sporadically during 2008.
Sample size estimation and poultry worker enrollment
Assuming the prevalence of HPAI H5N1 virus neutralizing
antibody to be 2.5% among poultry workers in Bangladesh,
with a confidence level of 95% and 1.5% confidence interval,
our estimated study sample size was 416 participants. This
was based on a lower estimated seroprevalence of HPAI H5N1
virus antibodies among occupationally exposed workers,
ranging from 0% [9–11] to 10% [12]. We estimated that
seroprevalence would be greater than 0% because of the high
prevalence of HPAI H5N1 viruses circulating among poultry in
Bangladesh and likely high exposures of poultry workers to
HPAI H5N1 virus-infected poultry. We enrolled poultry workers
aged 18 through 59 years who reported having direct and close
contact with poultry. Since this study was the first HPAI H5N1
virus antibody seroprevalence study conducted among poultry
workers in Bangladesh, the age range of 18 through 59 years
was used to maximize specificity for detection of neutralizing
antibody to HPAI H5N1 virus using microneutralization assay
combined with confirmatory Western blot and horse red blood
cell hemagglutination inhibition assays [13]. Although day
laborers participated in poultry culling, we did not recruit or
enroll any of day laborers because of their short exposure and
use of personal protective equipments provided by the DLS.
During 19 January-27 July 2009, field teams visited 129 farms
and the three markets to recruit, enroll, administer
questionnaires and collect blood specimens from the poultry
workers. Although we identified 131 farms with a history of
laboratory confirmed HPAI H5N1 poultry outbreaks, we could
not locate two farms. Forty farms did not have any workers as
the farms had shut down because of the outbreaks. Workers
were available from 89 farms. Workers who were present on
these farms during the outbreaks and present at the time of the
field team visit were asked for their written informed consent to
participate and enrolled. In the live bird markets we prepared a
list of 305 workers who were present from 8: 00 AM to 5: 00
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PM and the field teams approached all available workers
during this time.
Questionnaire
Using a pre-tested questionnaire (questionnaire S1 and
questionnaire S2), the field team collected information on
demographics, poultry exposure, use of personal protective
measures and history of respiratory illness around the time of
poultry outbreaks. When interviewing market workers, field
teams also observed and recorded workers’ use of personal
protective measures during poultry handling.
Blood collection
Medical technologists collected a 10 ml blood specimen from
each participant. All blood samples collected within Dhaka
were transported in a cold box at 2–8°C to the icddr,b
laboratory at the end of each day and were centrifuged to
separate serum. Outside Dhaka, serum was separated from
blood at the end of each day using a portable centrifuge
machine, stored in a cold box at 2–8°C and transported to
icddr,b within 48 hours of collection. All sera were split into
three aliquots and stored at -70°C at icddr,b. One aliquot was
shipped frozen on dry ice to CDC, Influenza Division (Atlanta,
GA, USA), for serologic testing.
Laboratory methods
Sera were tested by the microneutralization assay as
previously described using A/Bangladesh/207095/2008 (H5N1;
clade 2.2.2) virus and modified to use an initial serum dilution
of 1:10 [13,14]. We calculated the geometric mean antibody
titers obtained in two or more replicate tests with a starting
serum dilution of 1:10. A seropositive result was defined as an
HPAI H5N1 virus neutralizing antibody titer ≥40 (equivalent to
WHO protocol criteria of ≥80), with confirmation by horse red
blood cell hemagglutination inhibition assay using the above
virus or an H5-specific Western blot assay using a recombinant
H5 (clade 2.2) protein as antigen as per WHO criteria
[13,15,16].
Statistical analyses
We performed Wilcoxon rank-sum to test the equality of
median age, duration of smoking for current smokers, duration
of employment with poultry and duration of poultry contact
during work activities and performed two-sample test of
proportions (Z-test) to test the equality of proportions for
gender, current smoker, chronic medical conditions, types of
poultry handled, different types of poultry contact through work
activities, contact with poultry that died from illness, post-
exposure oseltamivir chemoprophylaxis use and respiratory
illness experienced around poultry outbreak/die offs between
farm and market workers. We performed two-sample test of
proportions (Z-test) to test the equality of proportions for
different poultry exposures through work activities, contact with
dead poultry at farms, and participation in culling between male
and female farm workers. We performed two-sample t-test to
compare the mean age of workers with specific poultry
exposures to those without these exposures for farm and
market workers. We estimated the relative risk of having an
HPAI H5N1 virus neutralizing antibody titer ≥20 using a log
linear model. We calculated 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for
seroprevalence using binomial distribution.
Results
Demographics
We enrolled all 212 available workers from 89 farms and 210
workers from 3 live bird markets (Figure 1). None of the
available farm workers declined while 40 (16%) of the available
market workers refused to participate in the study. Of the farm
workers, 66 (31%) were enrolled within 6 months, 4 (2%) were
enrolled between 6–12 months, and the remaining 142 (67%)
were enrolled between 12–18 months of the onset of poultry
die-offs in the farms. The farm workers were older than the
market workers (median age: 33 versus 30 years, P=0.019)
(Table 1). Median duration of employment involving poultry was
longer for market workers compared to farm workers (120
months versus 60 months, P< 0.001) (Table 1).
Exposures to poultry
Participants reported poultry exposure through one or more
routine activities (Table 2). The most common exposures
among farm workers occurred during feeding (97%), giving
water (83%) and collecting eggs (83%) from poultry, while
market workers commonly were exposed during selling (85%),
feeding (53%), cleaning water (51%) and feeding trays (48%)
(Table 2). One hundred and two (48%) of 212 farm workers
reported participating in culling of poultry and 93% reported
using personal protective measures during culling (Table 2).
One hundred and one (99%) of 102 workers participating in
culling reported receiving post-exposure oseltamivir for
chemoprophylaxis. Both 91% of farm workers (193/212) and
85% of market workers (178/210) reported direct contact with
poultry that died from illness during a confirmed HPAI
H5N1poultry outbreak in the farm or suspected poultry die-offs
in the market (Table 2).
Among the farm workers, a higher proportion of female
workers reported cleaning poultry feeding trays (93% [26/28]
vs. 73% [135/184], p=0.025), defeathered poultry (43% [12/28]
vs. 19% [35/184], p=0.005), and eviscerated poultry (36%
[10/28] vs. 13% [24/184], p=0.002), compared to male workers,
respectively. A higher proportion of male workers reported
participated in poultry culling compared to female workers
(54% [100/184] vs. 7% [2/28], p=0.000). Farm workers who
participated in poultry culling were younger compared to those
who did not participate in culling (mean age: 33 vs. 37 years,
p=0.02). Market workers who fed poultry (mean age: 30 vs. 34
years, p=0.02), cleaned feeding trays (mean age: 30 vs. 34
years, p=0.006), cleaned water trays (mean age: 30 vs. 34
years, p=0.02), cleaned poultry feces (mean age: 30 vs. 33
years, p=0.02), slaughtered poultry (mean age: 30 vs. 33
years, p=0.01), defeathered poultry (mean age: 29 vs. 33
years, p=0.02), eviscerated poultry (mean age: 29 vs. 33 years,
p=0.009) and touched dead poultry (mean age: 31 vs. 33
years, p=0.04) were younger than workers without these
poultry exposures. One hundred and ten (52%) of 212 farm
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workers reported using one or more protective measures
during daily poultry care (Table 2). When asked, 99% of market
workers responded that they washed their hands while working
in the market. The use of protective measures, such as
wearing masks, gloves or handwashing, however, were not
observed by study field staff during data collection.
Seroprevalence of HPAI H5N1 virus antibody
The median time interval between date of onset of poultry
die-offs on the farms and collection of blood specimens from
farm workers was 444 days, range (22–543). No farm or live
bird market poultry workers tested seropositive for clade 2.2.2
HPAI H5N1 virus neutralizing antibodies (95% confidence
interval 0–1%). One market worker had a titer of 57 by MN
assay, but had negative results by confirmatory horse red
blood cell hemagglutination inhibition and western blot assays.
An additional seven market workers (3%) had titers of ≥20 and
<40. One market worker that had an HPAI H5N1 virus
neutralizing antibody titer of 20 by MN assay reported
feverishness, measured temperature ≥100.4°F, cough, runny
nose, bodyache and headache around the time of poultry die-
offs. All titers for farm workers were <20. As none of the
workers met the criteria for seropositivity but some of the
market workers had a titer of ≥20, we conducted a post-hoc
analysis to estimate the relative risk of having a neutralizing
antibody titer of ≥20 among the market workers. The relative
risk was higher among workers who reported that they
slaughtered (RR 11.0 [7/82 (9%) vs. 1/128 (1%), 95% CI 1.4–
87.1]), defeathered (RR 7.2 [6/62 (10%) vs. 2/148 (1%), 95%
CI 1.5–34.5]) or eviscerated (RR 6.8 [6/64 (9%) vs. 2/146 (1%),
95% CI 1.4–33.0]) poultry compared to workers who did not
Figure 1.  Location of confirmed HPAI H5N1 virus poultry farm outbreaks during December 2007-June 2009 and
suspected HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in live bird markets in 2009, Bangladesh.  
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073200.g001
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conduct those activities in the markets. Workers with an HPAI
H5N1 virus neutralizing antibody titer ≥20 were younger
compared to workers with an antibody titer <20 (Table 3).
Discussion
Despite extensive direct and close exposure to poultry at
both farms and markets, we did not find any serologic evidence
of HPAI H5N1 clade 2.2.2 virus infection among the serum
samples collected from either farm or market poultry workers
during the study period. Our results are similar to other HPAI
H5N1 virus antibody seroprevalence studies conducted among
poultry workers such as in Nigeria (clade 2.2 virus) [10],
Indonesia (clade 2.1 virus) [17] and Vietnam (clade 1 virus) [18]
where no serologically confirmed infections were observed.
Other studies in China have reported 0.2–3% seroprevalence
among poultry workers [9,19,20] with concurrent detection of
HPAI H5N1 virus in poultry and at live bird markets, using
either hemagglutination inhibition assay alone or with
confirmation by microneutralization assays. The highest
seroprevalence in poultry workers (estimated at 10%) was
reported from a 1997 study in Hong Kong of clade 0 HPAI
H5N1 virus neutralizing antibodies [12].
None of the individual poultry workers met the criteria for
seropositivity in our study which were those recommended by
WHO [15] and were developed to maximize both sensitivity and
specificity for detection of strain-specific anti-H5 antibodies as
evidence of HPAI H5N1 virus infection. Eight market workers
did have low HPAI H5N1 virus antibody titers by
microneutralization assay; for seven workers, titers were only
2-fold above the limit of detection for this assay and were not
confirmed by any other method. Slaughtering, defeathering and
evisceration of poultry were associated with an HPAI H5N1
virus antibody titer of ≥20 among market workers in our study.
Other studies have not found an association between low HPAI
H5N1 virus antibody titers and poultry worker occupational risk
factors [21].
Table 1. Baseline characteristics of poultry workers,
Bangladesh-2009.






Gender, male 184 (87) 210 (100) <0.001*
Median age in years (IQR) 33 (24–45) 30 (24–38) 0.02†
Current smoker 92 (43) 111 (53) 0.05*
  Median duration of smoking in
years (IQR)
8 (4–20) 10 (4–20) 0.7
Chronic medical conditions‡ 20 (9) 15 (7) 0.4
Median duration of employment
with poultry in months (IQR)
60 (36–120) 120 (60–216) <0.001†
*P-value for two-sample test of proportion
†P-value for Wilcoxon rank-sum test
‡Such as lung, liver, kidney, gastro-intestinal and heart diseases, diabetes mellitus
and allergies
It is difficult to interpret these low levels of HPAI H5N1 virus
neutralizing antibodies in a cross-sectional study. First, low
titers may indicate cross reactive antibodies from a previous
influenza A virus infection with a different subtype rather than
the presence of HPAI H5N1 virus-specific neutralizing
antibodies [11,13]. Single or multiple-clade H5N1 influenza
vaccines can generate cross-clade neutralizing antibodies in
humans and mice [22,23]. Nevertheless, only HPAI H5N1
clade 2.2.2 viruses were identified among domestic poultry in
Bangladesh during 2007–2009 [1]. Second, these low titers
could potentially reflect a limited neutralizing antibody response
in some individuals with HPAI H5N1 virus infection. One study
in Vietnam of persons with serologic evidence of clinically mild
or asymptomatic HPAI H5N1 virus infection reported relatively
lower neutralizing antibody titers compared with severely ill
cases [24]. Third, low titers may reflect past HPAI H5N1 virus
infection with declining neutralizing antibody titers over time to
when serum was sampled, to levels below our defined cut-off
titer defining a seropositive result [24,25].
We could not ascertain the actual time interval between
exposure to affected poultry and collection of blood samples for
the market workers. These workers probably experienced
multiple or on-going exposures to HPAI H5N1 virus-infected
poultry during 2008–2009 [26,27]. The long intervals between
poultry farm outbreaks and subsequent collection of blood
specimens from the poultry workers may have reduced our
ability to detect HPAI H5N1 virus antibodies. Collection of
serum closer to the time of exposure to confirmed HPAI H5N1
virus outbreaks among poultry and at multiple time points
would have enabled us to better assess the kinetics of the
HPAI H5N1 virus neutralizing antibody response over time
among farm and market workers. Other methods to assess the
cellular immune response such as measuring H5N1-specific T-
cell responses might help identify prior HPAI H5N1 virus
infections that resulted in asymptomatic or mild illness [28].
Exposure to HPAI H5N1 virus in poultry workers can potentially
include self-inoculation of mucous membranes (including
conjunctivae) of the respiratory tract after direct contact with
poultry or surfaces contaminated with feces, internal organ
tissues, or poultry blood; or through inhalation of large or small
droplets that are aerosolized such as those generated through
slaughtering, defeathering, or evisceration [29].
Most of the farm workers used some personal protective
equipment during culling and more than half reported using
protective measures during daily poultry care, which may have
reduced their exposure to HPAI H5N1 virus. Although all
participants tested seronegative, market workers may have had
greater exposure to sick or dead HPAI H5N1 virus-infected
poultry compared to farm workers because of unprotected
contact, higher frequency of contact and longer occupational
exposure. Avian influenza surveillance in live bird markets in
Dhaka has detected HPAI H5N1 viruses in multiple cloacal,
fecal or oropharyngeal poultry samples and in environmental
samples which suggests ongoing transmission of HPAI H5N1
viruses since 2008 [26,27,30]. HPAI H5N1 virus has also been
detected from similar environmental samples from live bird
markets in Indonesia [31].
Antibodies against HPAI H5N1 Virus, Bangladesh
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Table 2. Reported occupational exposure to confirmed or suspected HPAI H5N1 virus-infected poultry, use of personal
protective measures and respiratory illness among farm and market workers, Bangladesh-2009.
Variables Participants, n (%) P-value
 Farm worker (N=212) Market worker (N=210)  
Type of poultry handled (* for market workers)
Chicken    
  Layer 174 (82) 160 (76) 0.1
  Broiler 20 (9) 115 (55) <0.001†
  Broiler and layer 14 (7) - -
  Indigenous 1 (0.5) 132 (63) <0.001†
Duck - 72 (34) -
Pigeon - 36 (17) -
Quail 3 (1) - -
Duration of poultry contact during regular activities‡
  Hour/day, mean(range) 9 (2–14) 10 (3–18) <0.001§
  Days/week, mean (range) 7 (5–7) 7 (3–7) <0.001§
Lived in the farm premises 120 (57) NA║ -
Contact with poultry through regular activities*‡
  Sell poultry - 179 (85) -
  Feed poultry 206 (97) 112 (53) <0.001†
  Give water 176 (83) - -
  Collect egg 176 (83) - -
  Clean feeding tray 161 (76) 100 (48) <0.001†
  Clean water tray 168 (80) 106 (51) <0.001†
  Clean stall/faeces 130 (61) 79 (38) <0.001†
  Slaughter poultry 81 (38) 82 (39) 0.8
  Defeather 47 (22) 62 (30) 0.08
  Eviscerate 47 (22) 64 (31) 0.05
  Vaccinate poultry (vaccine other than avian influenza) 46 (22) - -
  Collect or transport faeces - 1 (0.5) -
Contact with poultry that died from illness‡ 193 (91) 178 (85) 0.048†
Participated in culling 102 (48) NA║ -
  Handled sick poultry during culling (n=102) 96 (94) - -
  Used personal protective measures during culling (n=102) 95 (93) - -
  Mask 95 (100) - -
  Gloves 92 (97) - -
  Overall/dress 91 (96) - -
  Washed hands after handling poultry 89 (94) - -
  Cap 88 (93) - -
  Eye protection/goggles 78 (82) - -
Received post-exposure oseltamivir chemoprophylaxis¶ 196 (93) 0 (0) <0.001†
  For <7 days 9 (5) - -
  For 7 days 181 (92) - -
  For >7 days 6 (3) - -
Visit to a live bird market around†the time of poultry outbreak 26 (12) NA║ -
Reported personal protective measures taken during regular activities*‡ 110 (52) Not asked -
  Sprayed disinfectants 90 (82) - -
  Washed hands after working with poultry 80 (73) - -
  Wore masks 73 (66) - -
  Changed clothes 37 (34) - -
  Wore gloves 30 (27) - -
  Wore boots/shoes 18 (16) - -
  Wore goggles 7 (6) - -
Frequency of using personal protective measures during regular activities‡ n=110 NA║ -
  Always 67 (61) - -
  Sometimes (<50% time) 26 (24) - -
Antibodies against HPAI H5N1 Virus, Bangladesh
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Considering the ongoing exposure of market workers, safe
poultry handling practices during these high-risk activities
should be promoted, such as designated slaughtering areas in
the markets with accessible running water and soap, and
actively promoting use of personal protective measures,
including respiratory protection [32]. Other technically
appropriate interventions such as slaughtering poultry in a bag
could minimize direct contact and reduce aerosolization of
HPAI virus. In the longer term, when financially viable,
designated slaughtering plants could be introduced.
Mathematical models have demonstrated that weekly market
rest days could be effective in reducing transmission of HPAI
H5N1 virus [33]. Monthly rest days implemented in Hong Kong
were associated with reduced detection of H9N2 virus in
chickens in retail live poultry markets [34]. Compulsory weekly
rest days have been recently initiated in the live bird markets in
the capital city, Dhaka. These measures could be effective in
reducing market worker exposures to all avian influenza A
viruses, including HPAI H5N1 virus.
Our findings need to be interpreted in light of several
limitations. To select live birds markets for this study, we used
the criterion of reported ≥5–10% daily poultry die-offs for two
consecutive days among caged poultry without laboratory
testing as a proxy for HPAI H5N1 virus infection of poultry. The
identified market die-offs coincided with confirmed HPAI H5N1
poultry outbreaks in farms nationwide and surveillance had
detected HPAI H5N1 virus in poultry and environmental
samples collected from live bird markets in Dhaka [26,27,30].
Thus workers in these markets likely had HPAI H5N1 virus
exposures. During an outbreak of human cases of HPAI H5N1
virus in Hong Kong in 1997, exposure to poultry with >10%
mortality was highly associated with H5 seropositivity among
poultry workers [12]. Additionally, poultry wholesalers at a live
bird market, the source of poultry for the first human case of
HPAI H5N1 virus infection in Bangladesh, also reported 5–10%
die-offs among caged chickens at that time [35]. Another
limitation was that poultry workers were interviewed a few
weeks to several months after the exposure and the long recall
period might have affected their ability to accurately recall the
types of exposures they may have had during the outbreaks.
Since the poultry die offs were major events in the farm
workers lives, however, we expect that they remembered the
events. The farm workers may have given socially acceptable
answers (courtesy bias) during self-reporting of protective
measure use, therefore the reported use of protective
measures is likely overestimated. Similarly, the market workers
may have over-reported their hand washing.
We did not find serologic evidence of HPAI H5N1 virus
infection among farm or market poultry workers during 2009,
consistent with a seroprevalence of ≤1%. Nevertheless, HPAI
H5N1 viruses continue to infect poultry in Bangladesh, and
since January 2011, there have been over 162 reported poultry
outbreaks, a three-fold increase compared to the same period
in 2010 [36]. The Food and Agriculture Organization classifies
Bangladesh as one of the six endemic countries for HPAI
H5N1 virus in poultry [37]. During 2011, two new clades of
HPAI H5N1 virus have been detected in Bangladesh: clade
2.3.2 that caused extensive crow die-offs, and clade 2.3.4
identified among poultry [38,39]. Pediatric cases of illness
Table 3. Characteristics of live bird market workers with
HPAI H5N1 virus neutralizing antibody titers <20 and ≥20
by microneutralization (MN) assay, Bangladesh-2009.
Characteristics
<20 neutralizing
antibody titer by MN
assay (N=202) n, (%)
≥20 neutralizing
antibody titer by MN
assay (N=8) n, (%)
Median age in years (IQR) 30 (24–38) 24 (21–33)
Smoker 111 (55) 0 (0)
Chronic medical conditions 15 (7) 0 (0)
Median duration of
employment with poultry in
months (IQR)
120 (60–216) 48 (33–90)
Contact with poultry in the market
  Fed poultry 107 (53) 5 (63)
  Cleaned feeding tray 95 (47) 5 (63)
  Cleaned water tray 101 (50) 5 (63)
  Cleaned cages/feces 76 (38) 3 (38)
  Slaughtered 75 (37) 7 (88)
  Defeathered 56 (28) 6 (75)
  Eviscerated 58 (29) 6 (75)
  Collected/transported feces 1 (0) 0 (0)
Contact with dead poultry in
the market
173 (86) 5 (63)
Table 2 (continued).
Variables Participants, n (%) P-value
 Farm worker (N=212) Market worker (N=210)  
  Most of the times (>50% time) 17 (16) - -
Respiratory illness around** poultry outbreak/die off 37 (17) 59 (28) 0.009†
*Multiple responses. Percentages do not sum up to 100.
†P-value for two-sample test of proportions
‡For farm workers, one week before poultry outbreaks to end of culling; for market workers, one week before to one week after the poultry die-offs
§P-value for Wilcoxon rank-sum test
║Not applicable
¶Oseltamivir was distributed to the farm workers by the government during culling
**7 before to 14 days after
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because of HPAI H5N1 virus infection and a case of illness
with low pathogenic avian influenza A (H9N2) virus infection
were also identified in 2011 [40]. HPAI H5N1 viral RNA was
identified by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain
reaction from nasal and throat swabs of three poultry workers
with mild upper respiratory tract illness in Dhaka in 2012
though live bird market surveillance [41,42]. These cases
together with the first fatal case of HPAI H5N1 virus infection in
2013 indicates an on-going public health risk of transmission of
HPAI H5N1 virus and other avian influenza A viruses to
humans in Bangladesh [43].
Our study demonstrated that the occupational risk of HPAI
H5N1 clade 2.2.2 virus infection among poultry workers
appeared to be low in 2009, but the risk that this infrequent
event represents to global public health remains substantial
[44]. In Bangladesh, with a population density of 964/square
kilometers for 142 million population and around 50% chickens
being reared in backyards, the impact of even low frequency of
poultry-to-human transmission of avian influenza A viruses,
including HPAI H5N1 virus, will be greater than in sparsely
populated countries [7,45]. Our study findings can serve as a
baseline for future HPAI H5N1 virus serosurveys in
Bangladesh. Serial collection of sera, for example, sampling at
intervals <6 months, will allow better interpretation of HPAI
H5N1 virus antibody titers. Continued close monitoring is
warranted for possible avian influenza A virus infections among
poultry workers in the country.
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